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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades, the inequality in compulsory education finance in China has remained 
a widespread and serious problem. Based on a provincial-level dataset in the period of 1998-
2008, this study analyzed the disparities of school funding in China, attempting to explore the 
important factors that may have contributed to the inequality. Using the methods of factor 
decomposition and regression-based decomposition of Gini coefficient, it showed that the 
inequality of school funding had not been reduced after recent governmental reforms. The 
level of economic development appeared to be highly associated with the inequality of 
expenditures for compulsory education. The empirical results of this analysis suggest that a 
sound system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers with built-in equalization features may 
need to be developed in China. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Though the finance schemes vary, most governments in the world provide 
basic education to their citizens. Equal opportunities to develop their talents 
are often considered by many as people’s fundamental human rights (Faure et 
al., 1972; Lin, 2009). Since education is one of the major channels for 
individuals to move up the social ladder in China, disparities in access and 
quality of education will inevitably result in inequality in people’s income and 
social status, and the inequality may become transmittable across generations 
(Lin, 2009). Though education expenditures do not provide an ideal measure 
of the underlying resources used by local governments for education or the 
outcomes of the process (Johnston and Duncombe, 1998), it remains a 
fundamental benchmark in evaluating the equality of public education system 
and continues to be an important concern of the public and the education 
community (Moser and Rubenstein, 2002). In recent decades, the Chinese 
government has implemented a series of reforms on its finance system for the 
nine-year compulsory education. Nevertheless, the school funding inequality 
across different regions has remained a widespread and serious problem even 
after several rounds of reforms, which has attracted a lot of public and 
academic attention in recent years.  
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Since the 1985 education finance reform, China has established a highly 
decentralized compulsory education finance system, with education funding 
relying more and more on revenue resources provided by local governments 
(Wang and Zhao, 2012).1  Later, two major governmental reforms in the 
country had an important impact on the compulsory education finance system. 
The first was the reform of the tax sharing system after 1994, which reinforced 
the central government’s financial resources, leaving local authorities with 
insufficient fiscal capacity for funding compulsory education, especially in 
rural areas. The second was the implementation of rural taxation reforms since 
2000 that led to the establishment of a new mechanism for financing 
compulsory education (Ding, 2008; Zhou and Liu, 2008) with the central and 
provincial governments playing a much more important role than before.  
 
Employing multiple methods, including factor decomposition and 
regression-based decomposition of Gini coefficient, this analysis intends to 
answer three research questions: First, what was the status of inequality in 
compulsory education finance after recent reforms in China? Second, how did 
each revenue source contribute to the inequality in total school revenues? 
Third, what major factors were associated with the inequality of spending for 
compulsory education in China? The empirical results of the analysis will 
provide new insights to identify the major factors that have contributed to the 
inequality in compulsory education finance and carry important implications 
for future governmental reforms in China.  
 
The analysis is conducted based on a provincial-level dataset in the period 
of 1998-2008. Investigating the inequality of funding for compulsory 
education at the provincial level can be very informative because the 
effectiveness of national equalization policies often depends on the behavior 
and policies of the 31 provincial-level governments, which consist of 22 
provinces, 5 Minority Autonomous Regions, and 4 Municipalities. As 
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2008) point out, in order to improve equity in the 
distribution of fiscal resources throughout the country, it may be necessary to 
determine to what extent provincial government actions contribute to or run 
counter to central government equalization objectives. Scholars who do 
educational research have also repeatedly argued that it would be beneficial 
for improving education equity if we could establish a compulsory education 
finance system in which provincial governments play a leading role (Wang et 
al., 2003; Wang, 2004). With the provincial governments being assigned 
greater responsibilities in the recently established new mechanism of 
compulsory education finance, the results of this analysis have important 
implications for understanding the behavior of provincial governments in the 
delivery of basic public services, in particular, compulsory education, thereby 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Local governments in this article refer to sub-provincial governments, including cities, 
urban districts, counties, townships and villages etc.  
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contributing to making more effective policies for addressing inequality in 
compulsory education finance in China. 
 
This paper is divided into six sections. Following the introduction is a 
description of the major reforms related to China’s compulsory education 
finance system. The third section provides a review of previous literature. The 
fourth section describes data and methodology for empirical analysis. The fifth 
section evaluates the inequality in revenue and spending for compulsory 
education and the major factors that were associated with the inequality over 
the period of 1998-2008, using the methods of factor decomposition and 
regression-based decomposition of Gini coefficient. The final section 
concludes with a discussion of directions for future research.  
 
2. CHANGES IN CHINA’S COMPULSORY EDUCATION FINANCE    
    SYSTEM 
	  
2.1 The Education Finance Reform of 1985  
	  
In 1985, China officially launched a reform that changed its formerly 
centralized compulsory education system with a narrow revenue base to a 
decentralized system with revenue collected from both budgetary and extra-
budgetary sources (Tsang, 1996).2 After the reform, extra-budgetary funds 
generated at the local level constituted an increasing share of total resources to 
compulsory education, and local governments became the primary financing 
source for compulsory education (Tsang, 1996; Tsang, 2001). The over-
decentralization of education financing put a great financial strain on local 
governments and resulted in a large disparity in funding for compulsory 
education (Tsang, 2000). Later, the tax sharing reform in 1994 left local 
authorities with insufficient fiscal capacity for funding the provision of 
compulsory education. With reduced fiscal capacity, provincial, and especially 
sub-provincial, governments often relied heavily on informal levies to make 
up for insufficient funding in the 1990s (Lin et al., 2007), which, over time, 
led to an excessive tax burden for farmers in rural areas (Ding, 2008; Zhou 
and Liu, 2008).  
 
2.2 The “Tax-For-Fee” Reform 
 
Since 2000, the Chinese central government has implemented a series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. The budgetary funds included allocations of local governments’ own-source revenue, and 
categorical grants from central and provincial governments, which comprised of only a minor 
share of funding for education. The extra-budgetary funds included funding from education 
surcharges in urban areas and education levies in rural areas as well as social contributions 
and school fees etc. See Tsang (1996) for a more detailed description on various budgetary 
and extra-budgetary funds for education.  
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“Tax-For-Fee” rural taxation reforms, abolishing all fees collected previously 
by townships and villages and replacing them with agriculture taxes and 
related surcharges (Lu et al., 2004). At the beginning of 2006, the government 
decided to phase out agricultural taxes completely (Lin et al., 2007). In the 
process of eliminating fees and agricultural taxes, the system whereby local 
governments assumed the major responsibility of funding for rural compulsory 
education could no longer be maintained (Zhou and Liu, 2008). Therefore, it 
became necessary for the government to establish a new scheme for financing 
its school system. 
    
2.3 The New Mechanism 
 
In the wake of the rural taxation reform, the Chinese central government 
has begun to take on more financial responsibility for compulsory education 
since 2001. It has introduced the “two exemptions and one subsidy” policy 
(TEOS) for the purpose of easing the financial difficulties shouldered by local 
governments and reducing the financial burdens of rural families for paying 
for their children’s education. Under this system, governments provide free 
textbooks to poor rural students as well as an exemption from “miscellaneous 
fees” (zafei) to the same students (the two exemptions), along with a subsidy 
to cover living costs for boarding students with financial difficulties (the one 
subsidy) (Brock et al., 2008). The central government originally only provided 
free textbooks to poor rural students. Since 2006, it has significantly increased 
its own share of funding to the TEOS program to cover the majority of costs 
for the exemption of miscellaneous fees. For western provinces, the central 
government provides 80% of the costs and the provincial and local 
government 20%. For provinces in central China, the central government 
covers 60%, and the shares for eastern provinces are negotiated on a case-by-
case basis. Since 2007, the central government has begun to provide one-third 
of the funding for the subsidy for boarding students, with the rest of the costs 
shared among the province, prefecture, and county levels (Brock et al., 2008).  
 
The expansion of the programs of TEOS has led to the formulation of a 
new finance mechanism for rural education (hereafter the “New Mechanism”) 
(Broack et al., 2008). In addition to TEOS, the New Mechanism includes 
measures to raising the overall level of public expenditure for rural 
compulsory education, creating a mechanism for more investment into rural 
school buildings, and ensuring prompt and full issuance of salaries to rural 
school teachers. The New Mechanism has been implemented in the western 
provinces since 2006, and has been extended to other provinces in the next 
year (Ding, 2008). The Chinese government has decided to provide a 
completely free compulsory education for all children in both rural and urban 
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areas nationwide since 2008.3  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 Since the 1990s, studies using province as a unit of analysis consistently 
found that severe inequality existed in funding for China’s compulsory 
education (Tsang, 1994; Jiang and Zhang, 1999; Li, 2008). Tsang (1994) 
showed that, in 1989, the top-spending province spent as much as 5.2 times 
that of the bottom-spending province in primary education; the corresponding 
ratio was 4.5 in secondary (both lower- and upper-) education. In 2000, these 
ratios rose to 10.6 in primary education and 6.6 in lower-secondary education 
(Tsang, 2001). Jiang and Zhang (1999) found that the ratio of total school 
spending among the three “Education Regions” in the country grew from 
2.8:1.5:1.0 in 1988 to 3.0:2.0:1.0 in 1992.4 
  
 In the previous literature, few scholars used decomposition methods to 
assess the impact of China’s education finance and taxation reforms on the 
inequality of China’s Compulsory education. This study contributes to the 
literature on this topic by employing the methods of inequality decomposition 
that have recently become available, using a panel dataset from recent years. 
The analysis of Li (2009) showed the change in disparities before and after the 
Tax-For-Fee reform based on a provincial-level dataset in 1995-2006. He 
found that the Theil index of per-pupil spending for primary schools increased 
after the reform, while that for lower-secondary schools increased even more 
substantially. The results of factor decomposition of inequality measures 
showed that the aid provided by the central government after the reform 
helped to reduce the inequality of spending within, but not across the eastern, 
central, and western regions. One possible explanation of the results was that 
the fiscal transfers from the central government probably only made up for the 
loss of education revenue collected from farmers, but were inadequate to 
substantially reduce the ever increasing disparities in fiscal capacity across the 
three regions. 
 
A number of studies investigated the factors that affected provincial 
education expenditures and their disparities in China, which suggested a 
framework for this analysis on what major factors might be associated with the 
inequality of spending for compulsory education. Previous research found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. For recent policy changes on China’s compulsory education, please see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/31/content_8867264.htm; accessed January 
18, 2011. 
4. In 1994, the Ministry of Education in China grouped all provinces into three regions based 
on the progress and capacity in achieving the universalization of nine-year compulsory 
education and the eradication of adult illiteracy. Please see Tsang and Ding (2005) for details 
on the three regions. 
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mixed results concerning the impact of economic development on education 
spending. For example, Wang et al. (1998) showed that provincial education 
expenditures were mainly determined by their level of economic development. 
Similarly, Wei and Yang (1998) found that uneven economic development 
caused severe disparities in education expenditures in different regions, due to 
the decentralization of funding for compulsory education, and the non-
existence of a sound system of fiscal transfers from the central to provincial 
governments. Contrary to some early studies, Wang and Yang (2008) found 
that provincial economic development did not contribute to increasing 
education spending as a share of GDP or total budgetary spending. The 
authors argued that, for provincial government officials, education 
development might not be as important as some other competing goals such as 
economic growth.  
 
In addition, Wang and Yang (2008) found that a higher share of state-
owned economy in total economy was associated with a lower share of 
educational investment in total budgetary expenditures. This suggested that the 
demand for governmental investment in state-owned enterprises might have 
prevented the allocation of more funding for education. The share of primary 
industry in total value of production also had a negative effect on the shares of 
education spending, which indicated that agricultural provinces might have 
different demand and preferences for educational investment in comparison to 
other more developed ones.  
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A dataset for all provincial-level governments from 1998-2008 is used for 
this analysis. Expenditure and revenue data for compulsory education are 
collected from various issues of the China Educational Finance Statistical 
Yearbook. Data for other socio-economic and demographic variables are from 
China Data Online run by All China Data Center.5  
 
In order to address the first research question concerning the status of 
inequality in compulsory education finance, descriptive statistics and Gini 
coefficients of education revenues and expenditures are reported for primary 
and lower-secondary schools in both urban and rural areas. To answer the 
second research question, a factor decomposition of Gini coefficient (Fei et al., 
1978; Shorrocks, 1982; Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985) is adopted to examine the 
contribution of each revenue source to the dispersion of total school revenues. 
To address the third research question regarding the factors associated with the 
inequality of expenditures for compulsory education, regression-based 
decomposition is employed to investigate the contribution of various factors to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. For information on China Data Online, please see http://chinadatacenter.org/; accessed 
January 18, 2011. 
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the total inequality (please see the Appendix for technical details of factor and 
regression-based decomposition). Decomposition by factor component needs 
to have complete information on all income sources and express total income 
as a sum of factor incomes. This approach only allows us to attribute total 
inequality to the income sources, not to the external factors that affect the 
inequality (Wan and Zhou, 2005). Following the methods proposed by 
Morduch and Sicular (2002), Fields (2003) and Qing and Tsui (2005), this 
analysis employs regression-based decomposition to explore the important 
factors that may have been associated with the inequality of expenditures for 
compulsory education in China. Using this method, the regression model is 
supplemented by decomposition analyses to quantify the relative contribution 
of different explanatory factors to the inequality. Based on the literature 
reviewed above, the following regression model is developed for the analysis:  
 𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑋𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛽! ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽!𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽!𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑀 + 𝛽!𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇 + 𝛽! ln 𝐷𝐸𝑁+ 𝛽!ln  (𝑅𝐸𝑉) + 𝛽!𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽!𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽!"𝑀𝐼𝑁 + 𝜀 
 
A double-log specification is adopted for the model. The dependent variable in 
the model is the natural log of per-pupil real spending, EXP, for primary and 
lower-secondary schools. GDP is per capita real GDP. STATE is the share of 
state-owned units in total investment in fixed assets, which proxies the 
economic ownership structure in provinces. PRIM is the share of primary 
(agriculture) industry output in total GDP, and TERT refers to the share of 
people employed by the tertiary (service) industry. These two variables 
indicate the industrial structure in provinces. DEN refers to population density, 
and REV per capita real budgetary revenue. The model also includes four 
dummy variables indicating the eastern region, the central region, the four 
municipalities, and the five minority autonomous regions. Though some 
important factors, such as the political economy of local decisions for 
education spending, are not controlled in this model due to data constraint, this 
exploratory research, as a first attempt to use regression-based decomposition 
for studying educational funding disparities in China, can still be informative 
and contribute to future research in this area. 
 
5. INEQUALITY IN COMPULSORY EDUCATION FINANCE IN  
    CHINA 
  
Table 1 presents the per-pupil revenue and spending for primary and 
lower-secondary schools in all 31 provincial-level governments in China in 
1998 and 2008. The per-pupil revenue increased from 764 RMB in 1998 to 
3,030 RMB in 2008 for primary schools, and from 1,310 RMB to 3,743 RMB 
in the same period for lower-secondary schools all over the country. Similarly, 
the per-pupil spending for compulsory education also increased substantially 
from 1998 to 2008. Budgetary revenue as a share of total revenue increased 
substantially from 63% in 1998 to 87% in 2008 for primary schools, and from 
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59% to 79% for lower-secondary schools nationwide. This shows that the 
Chinese government substantially increased its funding from budgetary 
sources for compulsory education over the period of 1998-2008.  
 
Table 1. Per-Pupil Education Revenue and Spending 
(in Real RMB) 
  
Primary School 
   
% of 
  
  
Total Budgetary % of Total 
Year Area Revenue Revenue Surcharge Spending 
1998 
Nationwide 764 63% 13% 746 
Eastern Region 1198 63% 14% 1173 
Central Region 549 56% 15% 537 
Western Region 639 73% 10% 621 
Rural area 652 64% 14% 637 
  
2008 
Nationwide 3030 87% 4% 2996 
Eastern Region 4988 82% 6% 4903 
Central Region 2075 87% 4% 2078 
Western Region 2453 93% 3% 2413 
Rural area 2887 92% 3% 2863 
Lower-secondary School 
1998 
Nationwide 1310 59% 13% 1275 
Eastern Region 1903 58% 14% 1843 
Central Region 968 53% 14% 944 
Western Region 1211 69% 10% 1187 
Rural area 1074 61% 14% 1056 
  
2008 
Nationwide 3743 79% 5% 3702 
Eastern Region 6409 74% 7% 6281 
Central Region 2430 78% 5% 2449 
Western Region 2975 84% 4% 2932 
Rural area 3342 88% 4% 3298 
Note: Revenue and spending data in the table have been adjusted for 
inflation with year 2000 as the base year. 
 
Comparing per-pupil education revenue and spending between rural areas 
and nationwide averages, rural areas had significantly lower revenue and 
spending for compulsory education in both 1998 and 2008. The differences in 
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education revenue between rural areas and national averages increased slightly 
from 1998 to 2008, whereas the differences in education spending declined 
moderately. To compare regional differences, in both 1998 and 2008 the 
eastern region had significantly higher education resources than the other two 
regions. In comparison to 1998, the gap between eastern and western regions 
widened in 2008. The higher reliance on budgetary revenue for provinces in 
the western region indicated that non-government resources continued to be 
more abundant in eastern and central regions (Tsang and Ding, 2005; Wang 
and Zhao, 2012).  
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the Gini coefficients of per-pupil real revenue and 
spending nationwide and in both rural and urban areas for primary schools 
across all provinces from 1998 to 2008. The Gini coefficient of per-pupil 
revenue for primary schools increased from 0.26 in 1998 to a peak of 0.34 in 
2003, and then decreased slightly to 0.30 in 2008. However, the Gini 
coefficient was still higher in 2008 than in 1998 after the implementation of 
the rural taxation reforms. In this period, the Gini coefficients of per-pupil 
revenue in rural areas were slightly higher than those in urban areas. A similar 
trend of change can be observed in Gini coefficients of per-pupil education 
spending nationwide and in both rural and urban areas over 1998-2008, with 
rural areas showing a slightly higher level of inequality than urban areas. This 
corresponds to previous studies (Kennedy, 2007; Wang and Zhao, 2012; Yep, 
2004) that showed an exacerbation of inequality in revenue and spending for 
compulsory education in China due to the implementation of Tax-For-Fee 
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Figure 1. Inequality in Education Revenue and Spending 
for Primary Schools (1998-2008) 
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reforms. Later, the introduction of the New Mechanism under which the 
central and provincial governments took on more responsibility for funding 
compulsory education, especially in western and central regions that needed 
more financial aid, appeared to have helped to a certain extent to reduce the 
inequality in education revenue and spending.  
 
Table 2. Factor Decomposition of Gini Coefficient of Education Revenue 
for Primary Schools 
  
 Year Revenue Source  
Gini Pseudo-Gini Relative Marginal 
 
/Gini Ratio Contribution Effect 
1998 
Budgetary 
appropriation 
(operating 
purposes) 
0.27 
1.13 72.1% 8.2% 
Total surcharges 0.70 8.8% -3.8% 
Institutional 
revenue (tuition 
and fees etc.) 0.82 9.9% -2.1% 
Revenue from 
enterprises and 
services 0.96 2.3% -0.1% 
Donation 0.36 1.9% -3.3% 
Capital revenue 0.22 0.3% -1.0% 
Other revenue 1.77 4.8% 2.1% 
2007 
Budgetary 
appropriation 
(operating 
purposes) 
0.32 
0.95 79.2% -4.3% 
Total surcharges 1.74 9.9% 4.2% 
Institutional 
revenue (tuition 
and fees etc.) 0.88 5.1% -0.7% 
Revenue from 
enterprises and 
services 0.92 0.3% 0.0% 
Donation 1.14 1.2% 0.1% 
Capital revenue 0.83 1.3% -0.3% 
Other revenue 1.45 3.0% 0.9% 
Note: Financial variables in the table have been adjusted for inflation with year 
2000 as the base year. 
 
In the next step, the method of factor decomposition of Gini coefficient is 
employed to show the impact of various revenue sources on the inequality of 
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per-pupil revenue for compulsory education across provinces. Data for per-
pupil education revenue in 1998 and 2007 is used for this analysis.6 The 
reason for selecting these years is that it covers the period from before the 
Tax-For-Fee reform and after the introduction of the New Mechanism for 
funding compulsory education in China.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of factor decomposition of Gini coefficient of 
education revenue for primary schools. The ratio of the pseudo-Gini of each 
revenue category to the Gini coefficient of total revenue shows the impact of 
each revenue source on the inequality of total revenue. If the ratio is larger 
than 1, it indicates that the revenue category is more widely dispersed along 
the rank of the total revenue. Thus it is a driving force of the overall inequality 
of total revenue. If the ratio is positive and smaller than 1, it suggests that the 
spending or revenue category has a weak equalization or “pooling” effect on 
the overall inequality. An intuitive analogy of the “pooling” effect is that 
dispersion acts like financial risk; combining multiple dispersed items tend to 
produce a less dispersed distribution (Zhao and Hou, 2008). Only when the 
ratio has a negative value, the spending or revenue category would have a 
strong equalization or offsetting effect on the inequality of total spending or 
revenue (Zhao, 2009).  
 
The Gini coefficient of per-pupil total revenue for primary schools 
increased from 0.27 in 1998 to 0.32 in 2007. Budgetary appropriation for 
operating purposes had a pseudo-ratio of larger than 1 in 1998, indicating that 
it contributed to increasing the Gini coefficient of total education revenue. The 
rest of the revenue sources, except for other revenue, had a pseudo-ratio of 
smaller than 1, suggesting that they helped to reduce the overall inequality in 
education revenue in 1998. In comparison to 1998, both budgetary 
appropriation for operating purposes and education surcharges had a different 
impact in 2007. Budgetary appropriation for operating purposes had a weak 
equalizing effect since its pseudo-ratio is 0.95, while education surcharges, 
with a pseudo-ratio of 1.74, contributed to driving up the overall inequality in 
education revenue. The results suggested that after the gradual elimination of 
rural surcharges in all provinces in consequence of the rural taxation reform, 
the increase of budgetary appropriations for local governments helped to 
reduce inequality in total education revenue. However, the existing urban and 
local surcharges still contributed to higher inequality. 7  Donation, with a 
pseudo-ratio of 1.14, also contributed to increasing the Gini coefficient of total 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. The categorization of education revenue for 2008 is slightly different from that for previous 
years in the China Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook.  
7. Surcharges for education were consisted of rural surcharges, urban surcharges, and local 
surcharges before the rural taxation reform. Rural surcharges were abolished due to the 
reform.  
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education revenue in 2007. It might be due to the fact that urban areas could 
attract more donations for education than rural areas. 
 
The relative contribution of each revenue source to the Gini coefficient is 
determined by both the share of each revenue source in total revenue and the 
pseudo-ratio.8 In 1998 and 2007, budgetary appropriation (operating purposes) 
contributed the most to the total inequality in comparison to other revenue 
sources, given its large share in total revenue. In 1998, it contributed 72.1% to 
the total inequality, whereas its contribution increased to 79.2% in 2007. The 
contribution of total surcharges to total inequality increased from 8.8% in 
1998 to 9.9% in 2007. The contribution of institutional revenue, including 
tuition and fees, dropped from 9.9% in 1998 to 5.1% in 2007.  
 
The final column of Table 2 shows the marginal effect of a small 
percentage change in a revenue source on the inequality of total revenue, 
holding all other revenue sources constant. One important change is the 
marginal effect of budgetary appropriation for operating purposes. A one-
percent increase in budgetary appropriation for operating purposes drove up 
the Gini coefficient of total education revenue for primary schools by 8.2% in 
1998, whereas it reduced the coefficient by 4.3% in 2007. This suggested that 
budgetary appropriation for operating purposes began to have an equalizing 
effect after the introduction of New Mechanism for financing compulsory 
education in China. In comparison, total surcharges for education helped to 
reduce the overall inequality in education revenue in 1998, but contributed to 
increasing the inequality in 2007. Its marginal effect changed from -3.8% in 
1998 to 4.2% in 2007. With a smaller share in total revenue, the marginal 
effect of institutional revenue dropped from -2.1% in 1998 to -0.7% in 2007.  
 
Table 3 shows the results of factor decomposition of Gini coefficient of 
education revenue for lower-secondary schools. Similar to the results 
presented in Table2, the marginal effects of budgetary appropriation for 
operating purposes indicate that it contributed to increasing the overall 
inequality in total education revenue in 1998, but had an equalizing effect in 
2007. In comparison, total surcharges for education helped to reduce the 
overall inequality in education revenue in 1998, but contributed to increasing 
the inequality in 2007. It shows that local governments with lower revenue 
capacity relied on surcharges for funding their compulsory education before 
the rural taxation reform. After the gradual elimination of rural surcharges in 
all provinces, local governments relied more on budgetary appropriations for 
funding, and the existing urban and local surcharges actually contributed to 
higher inequality in total education revenue. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8. Please see the Appendix for the formulas for the calculation of relative contribution and 
marginal effect of each factor component to total inequality. 
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Table 3. Factor Decomposition of Gini Coefficient of Education Revenue 
for Lower-secondary Schools 
  
    
Gini Pseudo-Gini Relative Marginal 
 
/Gini Ratio Contribution Effect 
1998 
Budgetary 
appropriation 
(operating purposes) 
0.27 
1.06 62.6% 3.8% 
Total surcharges 0.69 8.7% -3.9% 
Institutional revenue 
(tuition and fees 
etc.) 0.87 12.8% -1.9% 
Revenue from 
enterprises and 
services 1.12 3.0% 0.3% 
Donation 0.90 5.7% -0.6% 
Capital revenue 0.75 1.0% -0.4% 
Other revenue 1.76 6.2% 2.7% 
2007 
Budgetary 
appropriation 
(operating purposes) 
0.32 
0.92 68.5% -6.3% 
Total surcharges 1.66 12.2% 4.8% 
Institutional revenue 
(tuition and fees 
etc.) 0.87 8.9% -1.4% 
Revenue from 
enterprises and 
services 1.04 0.5% 0.0% 
Donation 1.43 1.9% 0.6% 
Capital revenue 1.22 3.6% 0.7% 
Other revenue 1.58 4.3% 1.6% 
Note: Financial variables in the table have been adjusted for inflation with year 
2000 as the base year. 
 
The final step of the analysis is to use the regression-based approach to 
decompose the major factors that may have been associated with the 
inequality of expenditures for compulsory education. Summary statistics of the 
variables included in the regression model are reported in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of Variables in the Regression Model 
(1998-2008) 
 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
EXP (per-pupil real education 
expenditure) 4020.64 3508.48 808.80 24345.18 
GDP (per capita real GDP) 12859.91 10069.65 2294.74 60715.16 
STATE (share of state-owned 
units in total investment in fixed 
assets) 46.95 14.42 14.54 95.89 
PRIM (share of primary 
industry output in GDP) 15.65 7.62 0.82 37.91 
TERT (share of people 
employed by the tertiary 
industry) 31.42 8.46 16.34 72.53 
DEN (population density) 1084.05 3454.65 1.44 19377.02 
REV (per capita real budgetary 
revenue) 1083.52 1415.25 142.99 10370.78 
EAST (eastern region) 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
CENTRAL (central region) 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
MUN (municipalities) 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
MIN (minority autonomous 
regions) 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Note: The number of observation is 341. Financial variables in the table have 
been adjusted for inflation with year 2000 as the base year. 
 
To examine the major factors associated with the average education 
expenditures of provinces over time, between-effects models were estimated 
for the regression analysis, which attempted to model the mean response 
where the means are calculated for each of the provinces. In other words, the 
cross-sectional information reflected in the changes between provinces was 
used for this regression analysis. Four regression models were conducted for 
the whole period of 1998-2008, and the three separate periods of 1998-1999 
(before the reform), 2000-2005 (rural taxation reform), and 2006-2008 
(introduction of the New Mechanism). The empirical results are summarized 
in Table 5. The four regression models explain 85.7% to 92.6% of the log-
variance of per-pupil real expenditure for primary and lower-secondary 
schools. The contributions of explanatory variables in the model to the 
inequality of education spending across provinces differ enormously. Among 
all the statistically significant variables in the model, per capita real GDP was 
the most important variable that was significantly associated with the 
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inequality of education spending, with a contribution of 78.1% in the whole 
period of 1998-2008, 93.6% in 1998-1999, 77.6% in 2000-2005, and 75.0% in  
 
Table 5. Regression and Decomposition Results 
  
 
1998-2008 1998-1999 2000-2005 2006-2008 
  β % β % β % β % 
ln(GDP) 0.896*** 78.1% 1.003*** 93.6% 0.866*** 77.6% 0.871*** 75.0% 
  (3.456)   (3.531)   (3.077) 
 
(3.058)   
STATE 0.012* -3.0% 0.010** 1.5% 0.018*** -7.4% 0.011 -2.6% 
  (1.758)   (2.363)   (3.334) 
 
(1.511)   
PRIM 0.018* -14.4% 0.021** -20.5% 0.016** -13.9% 0.017* -13.6% 
  (2.055)   (2.402)   (2.18) 
 
(1.793)   
TERT 0.018** 25.2% -0.008 -8.4% 0.000 0.1% 0.019** 26.6% 
  (2.491)   (-0.678)   (0.014) 
 
(2.437)   
ln(DEN) -0.029 1.4% -0.041 4.1% -0.016 1.2% -0.032 1.6% 
  (-1.019)   (-1.441)   (-0.589) 
 
(-1.052)   
ln(REV) -0.043 -4.9% -0.071 -7.6% 0.205 23.3% -0.057 -6.5% 
  (-0.22)   (-0.329)   (0.879) 
 
(-0.268)   
REG1 0.012 0.8% 0.065 4.1% 0.023 1.4% 0.050 3.1% 
  (0.058)   (0.277)   (0.112) 
 
(0.225)   
REG2 -0.204 9.0% -0.141 7.1% -0.120 5.9% -0.159 7.1% 
  (-1.545)   (-0.818)   (-0.799) 
 
(-1.145)   
MUN 0.012 0.5% 0.280 12.0% 0.099 4.0% 0.022 0.9% 
  (0.077)   (1.733)   (0.686) 
 
(0.136)   
MIN -0.122 0.0% -0.058* -0.3% 0.020 0.1% -0.059 0.0% 
  (-0.869)   (-0.346)   (0.142)   (-0.399)   
Constant -0.909   -1.378   -2.228   -0.567   
  (-0.487)   (-0.749)   (-1.277)   (-0.277)   
          
Residual 7.4% 14.3% 7.7% 8.5% 
R-squared 0.926 0.857 0.923 0.915 
No. of 
Obs. 341 62 186 93 
Note: Significance levels are: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
2006-2008, respectively. The share of state-owned units in total investment in 
fixed assets contributed to increasing the log-variance of education spending 
in 1998-1999, but it appeared to reduce the dispersion in 2000-2005. It did not 
have a significant impact in the model for 2006-2008. In the whole period of 
1998-2008, it helped to reduce the inequality in education spending, with a 
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contribution of -3.0%. The share of primary (agriculture) industry output in 
total GDP contributed negatively to the inequality in education spending, with 
a share of -13.6% to  -20.5% in the three separate time periods. The share of 
people employed by the tertiary (service) industry was significant in the 
models for 1998-2008 and for 2006-2008; it contributed positively to the 
dispersion in education spending, with a share of 25.2% in 1998-2008 and 
26.6% in 2006-2008. Holding all other variables constant, population density 
and local revenue did not have a significant impact on the dependent variable. 
The dummy for minority autonomous regions had a significant effect on the 
dependent variable in 1998-1999, but its contribution was fairly small. All 
other dummy variables did not appear to have a conspicuous impact on the 
inequality of education spending. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Based on a provincial-level dataset in 1998-2008, this study examined the 
inequality in compulsory education finance after some recent governmental 
reforms in China. It found that the inequality of revenue and spending for 
primary and lower-secondary schools reached the peak during the rural 
taxation reform. The inequality only dropped moderately after the introduction 
of the New Mechanism for funding compulsory education. 
 
Using factor decomposition of Gini coefficient to evaluate the contribution 
of various revenue sources to the inequality of total education revenue, this 
study found that budgetary appropriation for operating purposes as a share of 
total revenue became a much more important source of revenue after the rural 
taxation reform; it contributed to increasing the overall inequality in total 
education revenue in 1998, but began to have an equalizing effect in 2007 
after the introduction of the New Mechanism for funding compulsory 
education. Local governments in rural areas relied on surcharges as an 
important source of revenue for education before the rural taxation reform. 
After the elimination of rural surcharges, local governments turned to 
budgetary appropriations for funding, but the existing urban and local 
surcharges still contributed to higher inequality in total education revenue. As 
indicated by previous studies, informal revenue sources, such as surcharges, 
could regain their importance for financing compulsory education due to 
insufficient local revenue capacity and imbalanced intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements in China (Wang and Zhao, 2012). Policymakers may want to 
take careful measures to prevent them from becoming excessive again over 
time.   
 
Finally, this analysis attempted to explore the major factors that may have 
been associated with the inequality of expenditures for compulsory education, 
using regression-based decomposition techniques. The empirical results of the 
analysis showed that, holding all other variables constant, per capita GDP had 
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a dominating effect on driving up the inequality of per-pupil spending for 
primary and lower-secondary schools. Other variables had different impact on 
the inequality over different periods of time, but their effects were not as 
conspicuous as per capita GDP. The insignificance of the per capita budgetary 
revenue variable suggested that provincial governments had not developed the 
revenue capacity to effectively mitigate the disparities in education 
expenditures resulted from uneven levels of economic development across 
provinces. The results of this exploratory research suggest that it remains a 
challenging task to make educational spending less dependent on or 
uncorrelated with the level of economic development. A sound system of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers with built-in equalization features may still 
need to be put into place to help reduce the disparities in education resources 
across various provinces in China. 
 
The exploratory study presented in this paper could be improved with a 
better model to capture the important factors, such as political economy 
factors, that affected spending for compulsory education in China, though the 
availability of data may be a constraint. In future research on China’s 
education policy and finance, the methods of factor decomposition and 
regression-based decomposition can be used for different purposes. While 
factor decomposition can reveal funding inequality by revenue sources and by 
population subgroups, the regression-based method gives the opportunity to 
quantify the relative contribution of a set of explanatory variables that are 
correlated with the inequality in education spending. A caveat has to be made 
that the cost for the delivery of public education may vary significantly across 
geographic locations. Cost factors of education service should be incorporated 
in future research on the equity and adequacy of education finance in China.  
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APPENDIX ON FACTOR AND REGRESSION-BASED 
DECOMPOSTION 
Factor Decomposition 
 
According to Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1978), the Gini coefficient of income 
can be decomposed by the sources of income that make up the total income. 
Let  denote the income of individual i (i = 1,…, n) from source k (k = 1,…, 
K), then the Gini coefficient of total income, G(Y), can be transformed to 
 
 (1) 
 
where  is the mean of ,  is the mean of , and 
 
 (2) 
 
is known as the pseudo-Gini for source k. It is not the conventional Gini value 
G(Yk), since the weights attached to  correspond to the rank of individual i 
in the distribution of  which, in general, is not the same as its rank in the 
distribution of . In addition, we can define the absolute and relative 
contribution of income source k to total income inequality as Sk(G) and sk(G), 
respectively. 
  
;   (3) and (4) 
 
Equivalently, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) show that we can decompose 
the impact of any income source upon total inequality in total income as the 
product of three easily interpreted terms: the share of the income source in 
total income, , inequality in the distribution of the income source k, G(Yk), 
and the “Gini correlation” between the income source and the distribution of 
total income, .9 One advantage of this transformation is that we can also 
estimate the effect of a small change 	  in a specific income source k on 
inequality of total income, holding income from all other sources constant 
(See Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985, p.153). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The Gini correlation for source k is effectively the ratio of k’s Pseudo-Gini over k’s Gini 
coefficient. Similar to Pearson’s correlation, the Gini correlation ranges between -1 and +1, 
but it will take on more extreme values than Pearson’s (See Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985, 
p.152).	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 (5) 
 
Regression-based Decomposition 
 
In general, the inequality of the target variable (e.g. income) is 
decomposed into components associated with several determinant variables in 
the regression equation. The first step in the decomposition analysis is to run 
the income-generating function.  
 
 (6) 
 
where lnY is the logarithm of the income, are explanatory variables or 
income components, and are the regression coefficients. The equation can 
be rewritten as 
  
(7) 
 
where , and . Then the log-variance of 
income can be decomposed as  
 
 (8) 
 
where  is the share of contribution of j factor to the inequality of lnY 
(Qing and Tsui 2005). 
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